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I. 
SUMMARY OF DR. MENA'S ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
In this Disabled Physician Act ("DPA") case, the Board made a mental health referral to 
its Examining Committee (LC. § 54-1833 (b )) and named two psychiatrists to its three physician 
committee. The Examining Committee evaluated Dr. Mena and reported its recommendations 
to the Board that Dr. Mena was fit to "continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable 
skill and safety" (Exhibit 8, p.2) and without recommending substantive practice restrictions. 
The Board accepted the report, but, without referring the matter back to its Examining 
Committee (LC.§ 54-1836(b)) added substantive restrictions in areas neither referred to its 
Examining Committee nor addressed in the Examining Committee's recommendations. In 
September it requested that Dr. Mena see a neuropsychologist for repeat testing and evaluation. 
In Dr. Beaver's report, dated September 9, 2012, (Exhibit 9, p. 12), the mental health evaluator 
concluded: 
"From a neurocognitive perspective, I did not observe any 
neurocognitive deficits that would interfere with his capacity to 
engage in clinical practice as a family practice physician." 
The neurocognitive evaluator, not a physician, was not asked to evaluate particular 
substantive areas of Dr. Mena's practice but knew the examinee was a family practice physician. 
The reports of both the Examining Committee and Dr. Beaver reflect Dr. Mena's 
concurrence in his ongoing medical monitoring as recommended. In May 2013, the Board filed 
its formal DPA case because Dr. Mena declined to agree with substantive restrictions on his 
license to practice medicine (Respondent's Brief, p.1). At hearing the Board did not call to 
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testify any of its Examining Committee members, or the retesting neuropsychologist whose 
reports constitute the only record of their review and fitness to practice recommendations 
consistent with Dr. Mena's then current practice. Their recommendations were prospective as 
of the summer of 2012, and that perspective is an appropriately inherent component of DPA 
review and analysis. They, too, had available medical reports concerning Dr. Mena dating back 
several years and disclosing prior provisional diagnoses of anxiety, mild depression, sleep 
disorders, professional burnout, possibly ADHA (eliminated) and suspicion of addiction (ruled 
out). And they discussed his successful CPAP treatment and prescribed use of a mild anti-
anxiety medication with counseling. As then being examined and treated in mid-2012, Dr. Mena 
was doing well, was being medically managed and monitored, and was deemed by the Board's 
designated examiners as fit to continue his family practice. That was also the observation of the 
hearing officer in viewing their "recommendations as both reasonable and prudent", and 
observing that they "amount to little more than continuing medication as needed and continued 
counseling" (Recommended Findings, p. 10). The Board also adopted his factual findings. 
Presumably based in part on records several years old admitted in rebuttal over objection 
(Exhibits 11, 12 and 13), the hearing officer, a non-physician, concluded that there "must be 
some level of disability or impairment" (Recommended Findings, p.10) authorizing the Board's 
issuing "one or more of the three (3) potential orders" (Recommended Findings, p. 10) under the 
DPA's disposition section, LC.§ 54-1837 (c). 
The legal problem with this case rests less with the hearing officer's observations and 
rulings, but with the Board's handling of various recommendations provided by all those whose 
recommendations it says it adopted and considered. Citing the non-physician hearing officer, the 
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Board concluded that Dr. Mena "suffers from some level of impairment", and on that basis stated 
its "purpose of providing an acceptable procedure for dealing with his psychological status and 
deficiencies in his practice of medicine" (Final Order, p. 3, second paragraph). In doing so, 
citing a MPA disciplinary statute, LC. § 54-1802, the Board purposefully announced: 
"Accordingly, the Board deemed sanctions were necessary upon 
Respondent's License to fulfill its statutory duty." 
Without question, the Board relinquished its DP A perspective and imposed MP A 
disciplinary sanctions apparently addressing "deficiencies in his practice of medicine" not 
referred to or evaluated by its Examining Committee and, importantly, not a substantive part of 
Dr. Mena's general practice for several years, by choice and agreement. It was in its 
adjudicative role, in application of statutes it administers, that the Board departed from its 
legislatively delegated statutory authority under the DPA to Dr. Mena's permanent professional 
detriment. In particular, it thereafter mandated that Dr. Mena "shall permanently cease from 
practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management" (Final Order, Sanction 5, p.3.). 
Both the Board in its regulatory role, and the District court sitting in judicial review, 
erred in construing the Board's statutory power to allow the internal transmutation of a DPA 
review into a case invoking and imposing disciplinary sanctions, specifically a permanent license 
restriction, under the cited auspices of the MPA' s disciplinary Sections. Dr. Mena requests 
reversal. 
II. 
COMMENTS ON THE BOARD'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
In pages 2 through 6 of its brief, the Board reviews information condensed from rebuttal 
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evidence admitted over objection, and pertaining to in-hospital reviews during 2007 -2009. Dr. 
Mena had been precluded from discussing the activities giving rise to the hospital's prior reviews 
and recommended evaluations and retraining due to Idaho's pervasive peer review exclusionary 
rule, although those circumstances marked the inception of events about which the Board 
inquired in requesting (Exhibit 2) Dr. Mena's written response to a reported "adverse clinical 
privilege action" (Exhibit 1 ). The Board staff witness described Dr. Mena' s solicited report 
(Exhibit 4) as "rambling" and about which the Board was "very concerned" (Tr., p. 27, lines 20-
21). No Board member testified about the nature of the Board's concerns at the time. Dr. Mena 
described how, unrepresented by counsel, he ran out of time, pulled together his computer-based 
notes and hurriedly delivered a draft response to the Board at the given deadline, "something that 
should have never happened" (see, Tr. pp.137-139). 
In discussing Dr. Mena's inadvertently being allowed to take an American Board of 
Family Medicine recertification examination when he was ineligible to do so by reason of an 
earlier stipulated license restriction, the Board's counsel characterizes his scoring 320 of 360 
possible points (88.88889%) as having failed "by a very large margin". Respondent's Brief, p. 8, 
1. 2. In fact, the hearing officer sustained an objection to her badgering a lay witness, Dr. Mena's 
wife, concerning the significance of his test score. (Tr., p. 65, 1. 14 - p. 66, 1. 11 ). 
In pages 8 - 11, the Board acknowledges the Examining Committee evaluations and the 
neurocognitive testing, and recites the findings. Yet, the Board's emphasis seems to be on the 
fact that Dr. Mena was several times presented with draft Stipulations and Orders to sign that he 
"refused" to sign, but not submitting any such documents in evidence to allow the hearing officer 
and this Court to see that they also included practice restrictions on his license involving chronic 
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pain and obstetric practices not recommended by the Board's Examining Committee in 
assessing his status under DPA statutory parameters and not in practice areas in which Dr. Mena 
had been participating for several years. 
That the District court would also initially refer to a listing of several past differential 
diagnoses considered in prior clinical reviews of Dr. Mena's past symptoms was expected. But 
judicial review was primarily requested not to address factual findings, but for a first impression 
analysis of the statutory differences between the Board's role under the DPA and the MPA. On 
that issue, the reviewing court below declined to become engaged, and minimally chose to treat 
the case as merely a matter of the Board's unwisely using the term "sanction" instead of 
"restriction", accepting its asserted entitlement to invoke and apply the MP A in a matter it 
initiated under the DP A, and without prior notice to, and to the professional detriment of, its 
physician licensee. 
The Board imposed that which from the inception it now appears it wanted to do, 
essentially ignoring the DPA in the end, and doing so overtly in a Final Order whose intention is 
hard to miss. In language and intent, it chose to punish Dr. Mena "permanently" by mandated 
"sanction" and license "restriction" concerning a practice niche beyond what he was then doing 
in his family practice, and had not done for several years. It did so impermissibly, Dr. Mena 
contends, through its purported reliance on the DPA, when, in fact, he was clearly sanctioned 
under the MP A as a disciplinary punishment. 
The Board cites the district court's comments on judicial review concerning past 
differential diagnoses entertained by those examining Dr. Mena (Respondent's Brief, p.12). In 
reviewing such lists, Dr. Beaver, for example, in 2012 testing found no evidence of "attention 
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issues", no evidence of "depression or anxiety at this time", and less evidence of 
"obsessive compulsiveness"; overall, his neurocognitive level was "performing within normal 
limits", and he was" no longer in psychotherapy on a scheduled basis" (Exhibit 9, p. 10). 
While the district court could observe that Dr. Mena's clinical issues, including differential 
diagnoses considered, rejected or resolved, had in the past "affected his ability to practice with 
reasonable skill and safety", that is not the issue to which the Board should have been directing 
its attention under the DPA statutory scheme. At the time of its 2012 review, the Examining 
Committee found no such safety risks or cognitive impediments potentially affecting patients in 
the family practice in which Dr. Mena was then engaged, and recommended no practice 
restrictions. 
III. 
THE BOARD AND DR. MENA SUBSTANTIALLY DISAGREE ON THE BOARD'S 
APPARENT CONTENTION THAT IT FULLY COMPLIED WITH REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE DPA IN ITS DELIBERATIVE HANDLING OF DR. MENA'S CASE 
Addressing Section IV factual assertions of the Board's Brief (Respondent's Brief, p.21 ), 
on May 21, 2013 (a typographical error in the Opening Brief not caught used 2012 for the year, 
an obvious error), the Board filed and formally served both its Notice of Hearing and Notice of 
Filing Examining Committee Report. These filings occurred almost eleven (11) months after the 
Examining Committee conducted its interview and evaluation of Dr. Mena on June 13, 2012, and 
issued its June 29, 2012, report recommendations to the Board. Indeed, the record does not 
indicate that the Board served Dr. Mena with a copy of the June 2012 Examining Committee 
Report until it filed for a hearing; nor is there an indication in Dr. Beaver's September 2012 
report (Exhibit 9) that Dr. Mena had received a copy of the Examining Committee's June 29 
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report at the time of the Beaver neurocognitive examination of September 6, 2012. Thus, 
contrary to the Board's assertion the Dr. Mena "was provided a copy of the Examining 
Committee report "before he agreed to see Dr. Beaver (Respondent's Brief, p.22), there is no 
such record. Additionally, Dr. Mena was apparently asked to undergo the Beaver 
neurocognitive testing at the Board's request the Examining Committee previously indicated that 
a formal psychiatric examination of Dr. Mena would not be helpful (Examining Committee 
Report, Exhibit 8, p.2) and gave no indication that it was recommending or requiring a Beaver 
retesting as either immediately necessary or required as either a precursor or condition to issuing 
its Examining Committee Report and recommendations to the referring Board on June 29, 2012, 
over 10 weeks before the Beaver examination was administered. Nor does the record indicate 
any Board request of its Examining Committee after receiving committee recommendations to 
reconsider its not recommending the imposition of license restrictions based on the original 
mental health referral or to further expand its examination. Most telling, no Examining 
Committee member was called by the Board to testify and the record is devoid of its 
considerations for its key recommendation of physician fitness without accompanying license 
restrictions. 
At the end of Section IV and in Section V of the Board's Brief, the essential statutory 
dispute between the parties with reference to the Board's authority becomes apparent. Both 
parties agree the case was filed in May 2013 as a Disabled Physician Act case, but the Board 
further asserts that "all the statutory mandates "of that DPA were met (Respondent's Brief, p.22). 
With this assertion Dr. Mena disagrees. 
The Board's premise is apparently that the authority and process under the two code 
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chapters it administers, the MPA and the DPA, "are virtually identical" (Reply Brief, p.21). It 
makes little difference to the Board, this case clearly demonstrates, whether a physician is being 
prosecuted for a disciplinary matter under the MPA or being evaluated under the DPA for his or 
her potential "inability ... to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety" (LC. § 54-1832) 
by reason of one or more of the three specified statutory causes. Dr. Mena disagrees with the 
Board's conceptual premise and submits there is a world of difference between a disciplinary and 
a disability encounter with a professional licensing agency, a difference that he and his 
professional peers are entitled to know and on which he is entitled to rely in dealing with his 
licensing agency. He respectfully asserts that the underlying statutes articulate a different 
evaluative goal, reflect a different relationship with licensees, effectuate different public policy 
purposes and arise from disparate regulatory intents toward professional licensees. Both parties 
do agree that neither the DPA, nor any of its substantive statutory components, has been 
comprehensively analyzed by Idaho's highest court. Nor has this Court ever addressed the 
position here being asserted by the Board that, in terms of process, the MP A and DPA are 
"identical", and, hence its relying internally on the disciplinary process of the MPA is sufficient 
and appropriate in a DP A case. 
As summarized in section I above, the Board's Final Order commences by setting out 
that this is a "disciplinary case" under the "Medical Practice Act" and enforcement rules under 
that act to "provide grounds for professional discipline" (Final Order, para. 1, p. 1). Again citing 
a MPA Section, the Board "deemed sanctions were necessary upon {Dr. Mena's] License to 
fulfill its statutory duty." (Final Order, para. 2, p. 3). Having failed to cite, address or even 
describe its process by which it measures and remediates circumstances involving physician 
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impairment or disability under the DPA, and only describing "sanctions" under the MPA, it is 
disingenuous for the Board to say it followed the DP A in its deliberative process. All it can say 
is that the processes are virtually identical and ask this court to believe that assertion as both its 
belief and its legal position respecting the relationship between the two acts it is charged with 
administering and enforcing. 
Turning to the "clear and unambiguous" provisions of the DPA the Board asserts it 
followed (Respondent's brief, p. 22), notwithstanding the MPA disciplinary sanctions it enforced 
and cited in its Final Order, Dr. Mena contends the Board failed to discharge it authorized duties 
under the DPA to his material detriment. This departure from statutory guidelines only occurred 
after the Examining Committee made its report. Until then, Dr. Mena concedes the Board 
appropriately refeITed his case to an Examining Committee under LC.§ 54-1833 as potentially 
falling within the parameters of LC. § 54-1832. The Examining Committee also discharged its 
statutory duties under the DPA set forth in LC.§§ 54-1834 and 54-1836 (a) in concluding: "that 
Dr. Mena can continue his present practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety" 
(Examining Committee Report, Exhibit 8, p. 3), subject to described periodic management. 
We also know the Board accepted the recommendation of its Examining Committee. 
However, unlike its Examining Committee, the Board, citing disciplinary sanctions, also 
imposed permanent license restriction respecting two substantive subspecialty practice areas 
( obstetrics and chronic pain management) that were not referred to its Examining Committee for 
review. Under LC. § 54-1836 (b) the Board could accept or reject its Examining Committee's 
recommendation "or may refer the matter back to the examining committee for further 
examination". From the language it used, the Examining Committee may have expected a 
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refe1Tal back when it made itself "available to discuss questions or concerns" of the Board 
referable to its recommendations; it specifically stated it was making no recommendations 
concerning obstetrics. It is Dr. Mena's contention that the Board, under the narrow parameters 
of the DPA, was not statutorily authorized, and did not have the unfettered discretion to impose 
additional restrictions or conditions in a DPA case; nor could it informally transmute a DPA 
filing into an MP A disciplinary matter by citing the imposition of disciplinary "sanctions" under 
cited MPA authority. 
The Board also asserts that when Dr. Mena was "unwilling to voluntarily agree with the 
recommended restrictions" (Respondent's Brief, p.22), it scheduled a hearing. Undoubtedly, the 
restrictions to which the Board makes reference are those restricting obstetric and chronic pain 
management practices and making those restrictions permanent, restrictions not recommended 
by the Board's Examining Committee. The Board cites LC.§§ 54-1835 and 1836 (c) 
(Respondent's Brief, p.22). However, the former§ is not tied to the Examining Committee 
provision; rather, it applies to a physician who "may request in writing to the Board a restriction 
of his license" that the Board may accept or not, or negotiate concerning, but if not, then the 
"physician is entitled to a hearing" (LC.§ 1836 (c )). If there is no physician's request "in 
writing" to be voluntarily restricted and addressed to the Board, it is not "clear and 
unambiguous", as the Board asserts, that the Board is entitled to demand and schedule a hearing. 
Indeed, it is just as plausible that only the ( a) and (b) subsections of LC. § 54-1836 are applicable 
to the Examining Committee report process of LC. § 54-1834; the third subsections, by its clear 
language, refers only to the voluntary, physician initiated, restriction process of LC. § 54-1835. 
When it elects to use the examining committee process, the Board is directed to "refer 
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matter back to the examining committee" when the committee has not recommended a 
license restriction but the Board believes a restriction should be considered under the limited 
referral processes of I.C. §§ 54-1832 and 1833. In the event the referred matter by the Board to 
it examining committee is one potentially involving the "mental illness" component of the DP A, 
LC. § 54-1832 ( a), as it did in this case, it is even more compelling that the Board should be 
constrained to respect the recommendations of an Examining Committee two-thirds of whom are 
psychiatrists, especially when the Board itself has no psychiatric expertise involved in the 
examination process. That situation is foreseen by the DPA statutory scheme in limiting Board 
action, if it does not accept its Examining Committee recommendations on "restrictions" 
causally related to "mental" illness or health components, to "refer the matter back to the 
examining committee for further examination committee and report thereon". This action under 
statutorily described circumstances here presented the Board completely failed to do, or even 
apparently consider. 
To the Board's assertions that Dr. Mena" ... has not pointed to one single place in the 
record that the Board did not comply with and follow the statutory mandates of the Disabled 
Physician Act" (Respondent's Brief, p 21), we have several responses, including: in its Final 
Order, and overtly in its analysis underlying its decision, the Board does not once cite the DPA 
as a basis for its decision-making process; secondly, Dr. Mena can only cite DPA statutory 
language not noted as having been followed because he has no other access to the private 
deliberations of the Board about which it called no one to testify; thirdly, there is no case law 
interpreting the processes of the DPA respecting two apparently parallel approaches to reaching 
a potential "restriction, suspension or revocation" under LC. § 54-1833, one through the 
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Examining Committee referral process when the Board "has reasonable cause to believe" a 
physician is "unable to practice medicine ... because of a condition described" in LC. § 54-1832, 
and another through the "voluntary" written request for a restriction on himself/herself by a 
physician described in LC.§ 54-1835. 
In retrospect, the Board jumps to the conclusion that it had to schedule a hearing 
following the Examining Committee recommendation, now citing only the DPA sections 
involving physician requests for a voluntary license "restriction" (LC. § 54-1835) and its 
preserved right of that requesting physician's entitlement to a hearing (LC.§ 54-1836 (c) 
(Respondent's Brief, 22, at bottom), while ignoring the guidance of LC. § 54-1836 (b ), the 
operative Section for Board handling of it appointed Examining Committee's recommendations. 
In this case the Examining Committee clearly recognized its role, imposing no illness-related 
license restriction for the mental health issues it reviewed on Board referral, but making its 
members "available to address questions or concerns" of the Board even though it did not 
believe that "requiring a formal Psychiatric evaluation at this time would be helpful" (Exhibit 8, 
p.2, at bottom). At the very least, the Board deviated from this statutory requirement of returning 
the matter to its Examining Committee with reference to concerns about the permanent 
restrictions from "practicing obstetrics and chronic pain management" that by Final Order it 
imposed (Final Order, p. 3, "Sanction" 5). 
It is no answer to Dr. Mena' s contentions that language used in describing penalties or 
sanctions that may be imposed for "disciplinary" transgressions under the MPA are similarly 
phrased, but in a different context, than in the DP A. That does not make them "identical" as the 
Board several times asserts. The context is the differentiating key. To argue that the "options" 
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to the Board and processes are "identical" between "Adjudication of Discipline or Exoneration" 
(LC.§ 54-1806A (9)) under the MPA and recommending the "care, counseling or treatment" of 
an ill, infirm, addicted or mentally impaired physician under the DPA (LC.§§ 54-1837 (c)(l) 
and 54-1832) stretches both reality and credibility. 
It is also an insufficient answer to suggest, as does the Board (Respondent's Brief, p. 23-
4) that merely by now changing all its denominated disciplinary "sanctions" to "restrictions", 
citing Judge Schroeder, remedies the Board's underlying misapplication of its authorization 
under the DPA by substituting its more expansive disciplinary discretion under the oft-
interpreted MPA. The legislature thought a differentiation between the Board's invested 
disciplinary authority and its described responsibility for assessing its licensees 
impairment/inability/disability ought to be separately stated, and those functions remain 
unintegrated by statutory consolidation or judicial interpretation to date. Dr. Mena submits that 
this Court should not so easily defer to the Board's practice of equating all its adjudicative 
practices against its licensees as disciplinary in nature, approach and handling irrespective of 
underlying circumstances. That there is a historic companion act in LC. Chapter 18 narrowly 
delineating a different process for non-disciplinary matters involving aging, illness (physical and 
mental), and addiction warrants judicial sensitivity to differentiation between the handling of 
MPA and DPA cases that the Legislature long ago enacted and the Board cannot cavalierly 
ignore by asserting virtual identity in the interpretation and application of disparate licensing 
authorizations involving licensee discipline (MPA) and disability (DP A). 
Also in Section IV of the Board's Brief, the Board takes Dr. Mena to task for not 
describing in more detail the Board's request of him to respond by November 11, 2011, to a 
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"notice of adverse clinical action" reported to have been taken against him by St. Luke's Jerome, 
and to include a "written personal response" and "a copy of pertinent records" (Exhibit 2). The 
Board made its request of Dr. Mena based on a single page letter signed by the local hospital 
Chief of Staff dated September 26, 2111, but referring to action reportedly taken on April 15, 
2111 (Exhibit 1), over 15 months after Dr. Mena's hospital privileges had expired because he 
was no longer specialty board certified (Exhibit 111 ). The nature of the Board request was 
confusing to him because he did not believe he then had hospital privileges on which an action 
could have then be taken. (Tr., p. 109, 11. 14 - 22). And the only records of a patient who 
possibly fit the description of the one involved in the incident about whom the Board inquired 
was a hospital based obstetrical patient whose delivery he attended with an obstetrician in 
December 2006; and it was to her care he had been asked to write the Board, and to provide the 
board her confidential patient hospital chart to which he then had no access as a non-staff 
member. Dr. Mena's response to the Board's request for clinical information about a patient's 
treatment was what produced the response the Board admits triggered its concerns about Dr. 
Mena's mental health and state of mind (Exhibit 4). 
IV. 
DR. MENA READS THE DPA AS REQUIRING THE EXAMINING COMMITTEE TO 
ASSESS A THEN CURRENT CONDITION, OR CONDITIONS, FALLING WITHIN 
THE I.C. SECTION 54-1832 THREE SUBSECTIONS AS CAUSING PRESENT 
"INABILITY" TO PRACTICE MEDICINE WITH REASONABLE SKILL AND 
SAFETY" 
In the Board's discussions in its sections V and VI, it seems to be saying that all it is 
required to do is develop a list of conditions a physician being examined had in the past, assert 
that such condition must indicate "some impairment" ( as the hearing officer was persuaded to 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/RESPONDENT- 14 
45996.0001.7705195. l 
conclude in this instance) and that is a sufficient finding to impose a license restriction under its 
regulatory statutes, including the DP A. The Board appears to ignore, or discount, the temporal 
relationship between any differential diagnosis in the past and the existence of present health 
condition warranting restriction. The Board states several times, in essence, that because Dr. 
Mena once had symptoms giving rise to differential diagnoses, and also continuing treatment for 
sleep apnea and anxiety in this case, it may impose a restriction on that physician's practice 
without reference to whether, at the time of its Examining Committee's evaluation, the "fitness" 
standard of the DPA had been met. Both the Board and the district court seemed to believe that 
merely by listing prior medical conditions or diagnoses, they could extract an evidentiary finding 
that there "must be some impairment" warranting the imposition of a license restriction. The 
Examining Committee and the neuropsychologist, under the DPA model of examining the 
physician's condition at the time, and the practice in which he was then engaged, failed to find 
that Dr. Mena fell below the statutory fitness standard. The Board, in processes addressed 
above, differed on the standard it imposed. This standard is statutory in its presentation and a 
matter of law to which this court's attention is directed on appeal. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that in directing the Court's 
primary attention to the statutory interpretation of the Board's authority under the DPA, a matter 
of first impression, Dr. Mena respectfully requests that the decision on judicial review be 
reversed and the case remanded to the board with instructions to set aside its imposition of 
disciplinary sanctions under the DPA, and particularly the imposed sanction of a permanent 
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license restriction stated as sanction 5 of its Final Order. Moreover, the Board should be 
instructed to dismiss the DPA proceedings because alternative grounds for decision were not 
found to exist. 
DATED THIS ----f--',,"-- day of October, 2015. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
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